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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the conclusion that an action for damages can be maintained under it.2
Although the Borah-Van Nuys Act was undoubtedly intended to be
used primarily as a criminal statute, indications are that it will not be




Approximately fifteen years have elapsed since the Chandler Act
became law and amended the Bankruptcy Act. That Act, in making
substantial changes to the partnership section, seems to have produced
a relative tranquility over the years in that area of the law. But while
the amended partnership section reconciled some earlier conflicts, it
left others to be decided by the courts. This would appear, therefore,
to be an alipropriate occasion to take cognizance of the existing law, its
development, and its conflicts.
Since a partnersip is not defined in the Bankruptcy Act,' its exist-.
ence in fact' must -depend upon the applicable state laws. A partner-
ship is generally looked upon as "an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."'3  In fact, this is the
precise definition under the Uniform Partnership Act.4 Every partner
is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business and the
acts of a partner in the ordinary course of the business binds the part-
nership and the partners. Also, partners are liable jointly for the debts
and obligations of the partnership, and liable jointly and severally for
a tort or breach of trust of another partner in the course of the partner-
ship business. Because of these ordinary principles of partnership law,
the "aggregate theory" is usually applied in describing the legal sig-
nificance of a partnership.
The Bankruptcy Act, however, does not strictly adhere to the
-°80 CONG. REc. 9420 (1936). "Mr. Hancock of New York: 'If a vendor is
found guilty of discrimination as provided in this 'bill (Borah-Van Nuys) is he
subject to the aggrieved party for damages or has he committed a crime and
subjected himself to penalty?' Mr. Celler: 'If he violates the Borah-Van Nuys
provision or other provision of the bill, he is subject to penalties of a criminal
nature and has committed an offense.' Mr. Hancock: 'Would he also be liable
for triple damages?' Mr. Celler: 'And he would also have to respond in triple
damages under the provisions of the Clayton Act. Anyone aggrieved can sue."
1A partnership is included within the meaning of the term "person" in the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 11 U. S. C. § 1(23) (1947).
- It must be proved that there is a partnership in fact and not a mere partner-
ship by estoppel, and the burden of such proof falls upon the petitioner. Buck-
ingham v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Fed. 192 (6th Cir. 1904).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. . 59-36 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
'Id. See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-37 (1943 Recomp. 1950) for rules in
determining the existence of a partnership.
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"aggregate theory." In the famous case of Francis v. NcNealr Mr.
Justice Holmes, by strong dicta, is said to have committed the United
States Supreme Court to the "aggregate theory." However, in the
later case of Liberty National Bank v. Bear," the court recognized the
"entity theory," and is said by some commentators to have adopted it,7
even though the Supreme Court, in the latter case, explicitly stated that
"the conclusion stated is not in conflict with the decision in Francis v.
McNeal ..... 8 Instead of the constant haggling over the question of
which theory the Supreme Court has adopted, it would be better to
reconcile the cases by limiting their application to the narrow issues of
each case, for the result in each is well recognized today.
By the "entity theory" it is meant that a partnership owns its prop-
erty, and owes its own debts, apart from the individual property of the
members which it does not own and apart from the individual debts of
its members which it does not owe. The Bankruptcy Acts of 1898 and
1938 are recognized as generally following the "entity theory," but
the Act of 1938 follows the "entity theory" only on certain particulars,
and not in all phases of partnership bankruptcy. An adequate system
of bankruptcy involves an adoption of both theories for different pur-
poses.
Adjudication as a Bankrupt. The first instance in which the Act
follows the "entity theory" is in providing that a partnership may be
adjudged a bankrupt, as a legal entity separate and distinct from its
partners, either during its continuation or after its dissolution, but be-
fore winding up.9 The "dissolution" of a partnership is the change in
r228 U. S. 695 (1913). The question involved in the case was whether the
trustee of the adjudged partnership could administer the individual estate of a
non-adjudicated partner. In deciding in the affirmative it was stated by way of
dicta that "the notion that the firm is an entity disinct from its members has
grown in popularity, and the notion has been confirmed by recent speculations as
to the nature of corporations and the owners of any somewhat permanently
combined group without the aid of law. But the fact remains as true as ever
that partnership debts are debts of the member~s of the firm, and that the in-
dividual liability of the members is not collateral like that of a surety, but pri-
mary and direct, whatever priorities there may be in the marshalling of assets.
The nature of the liability is determined by the common law, not by the possible
intervention of the bankruptcy act." Id. at 696.
6276 U. S. 215 (1928). The question here was whether a judgment against
the partnership and the individual partners, which was acquired within four
months of adjudication of the firm, but not within four months of the adjudica-
tion of the individual partner, could be annulled as against the partners. Holding
in the negative, the Court emphasized that the partnership is a separate entity
under the Act and that the adjudication of the firm could not involve the adjudi-
cation of a partner as an individual.
'See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy
Act. 4 U. oF Ciai. L. REv. 369. 378 (1937).8 Libertv Nat. Bank v. Bear, 276 U. S. 215, 218 (1928).
'11 U. S. C. § 23(a) (1947). The section provides in full: "A partnership,
including a limited partnership containing one or more general partners, during
the continuation of the partnership business or after its dissolution and before the
final settlement thereof, may be adjudged a bankrupt either separately or jointly
with one or more of its general partners."
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the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associ-
ated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the
business.10 There are many causes of dissolution, all of which are
brought out in the Uniform Partnership Act, which has been adopted
in North Carolina.1" Suffice it to say that the bankruptcy of a partner
causes a dissolution of the firm. An adjudication of the firm is allowed
up to the time of winding up because until then the partnership is not
terminated.',
In order to have a partnership involuntarily adjudged bankrupt, it
must be shown that the partnership has committed one of the acts of
bankruptcy.' 3 While, of course, every partner is an agent of the part-
nership for the purpose of its business, he cannot bind the partnership
where he is not apparently carrying on in the usual manner the business
of the partnership, or where he has in fact no authority to act for the
partnership and the third party has knowledge that he has no author-
ity.' 4 Rarely, therefore, will a partner, without the consent of the other
partners, be able to commit an act which will constitute an act of bank-
ruptcy by the firm. Thus, the fact that one partner of a copartnership
embezzles the funds of the firm, and absconds and conceals himself,
constitutes no act of bankruptcy of the firm.' 5 Nor is it an act of
bankruptcy for which a firm may be adjudged bankrupt if one of its
members, out of his individual estate, prefers one of his own or one of
the firm creditors.16 A partner, without the consent of all partners,
cannot make as assignment of partnership property for the benefit of
creditors,'1 nor appoint a receiver,' 8 nor admit in writing the inability
of the firm to pay its debts and its willingness to be adjudged a bank-
rupt.' 9
Directly related with the problem of adjudicating the separate firm
0 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-59 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-61 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-60 (1943 Recomp. 1950). As to when there has
been a "winding up," see In re Pinson, 180 Fed. 787 (N. D. Ala. 1910); Holmes
v. Baker & Hamilton, 160 Fed. 922 (9th Cir. 1908).
"'The acts of bankruptcy are enumerated in 11 U. S. C. § 21(a) (1947).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-39 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
" Davis v. Davis, 104 Fed. 235 (S. D. S. D. 1900).
" Mills v. J. H. Fisher Co., 159 Fed. 897 (6th Cir. 1908). Where the partner
applies his separate estate to the payment of a creditor of the insolvent firm, he
thereby gives such creditor a preference over others of the same class, and
commits an act of bankruptcy, which may be made the basis of a petition by other
firm creditors to have him individually adjudged bankrupt.
If a partner commits a firm act of bankcruptcy with firm assets, this will also
be considered an individual act of bankruptcy by the partner. In re Meyer, 98
Fed. 976 (2d Cir. 1899).
", N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-39 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
" N. C. GEa. STAT. §§ 59-39(2), (3) (a) (1943 Recomp. 1950).
"fin re Wellesley, 252 Fed. 854 (N. D. Cal. 1917). Cf. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 59-41 (1943 Recomp. 1950) ("An admission or representation made by any
partner concerning partnership affairs within the scope of his authority as con-
ferred by this article is evidence against the partnership.")
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an involuntary bankrupt is the question of the effect of one of the part-
ners being an exempt party under the Act. That is, under the Act
neither a wage earner nor a farmer may be involuntarily adjudged
bankrupt.20 Although, however, one of the partners may be a wage
earner or a farmer, it is settled that the partnership may be adjudged
an involuntary bankrupt.21 "One who combines with others in a part-
nership enterprise becomes bound for the payment of the partnership
debts, and his assets will be drawn in to satisfy the partnership debts
even though he may not be a subject of involuntary bankruptcy.
2 2
The result of adjudicating the firm despite the exempt status of a part-
ner is a natural consequence of adherence to the "entity theory." If,
however, the firm itself is engaged in farming, it is not "wholly free
from doubt"23 whether the firm can or cannot be involuntarily ad-
judged.2 It would seem that the policy which exempts farmers should
be extended to exempt a partnership engaged in farming, despite the
strict logic that may be applied to the literal terms of the Act.
Additional questions are whether the partnership can be adjudged
bankrupt as a firm if one of the partners has died; if one of the partners
is insane; or if one of the partners is an infant. It is understood that
individually, the estate of a deceased person cannot be adjudged a
bankrupt.25  It is questionable, because of a conflict of authority,
whether a partnership, one of whose members has died, can be so
adjudged.20 There would seem to be no objection to it other than a
possible interference with the state court's administration of the estate
of the deceased partner. It has been suggested that even though it be
held that there can be no adjudication, that the rights of firm creditors
are not jeopardized. That is, even if the firm cannot be adjudged bank-
rupt, the surviving partner might be individually adjudged bankrupt,
thereby obtaining jurisdiction of the firm property, 7 As to an insane
person, it has been held that his insanity does not preclude the part-
nership, of which he is a member, from being adjudged bankrupt, even
20 11 U. S. C. § 22(b) (1947).
"2Ii re Disney, 219 Fed. 294 (D. Md. 1915) ; Dickas v. Barnes, 140 Fed. 8,19
(6th Cir. 1905).
22 Dickas v. Barnes, supra note 21 at 453.
221 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 5.10 (14th ed. 1940).
24 H. D. Still's Sons v. American Nat. Bank, 209 Fed. 749 (4th Cir. 1914) held
that a partnership engaged in farming is exempt. This decision is criticized in
Note, 12 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1914) on the theory that the exemption in the Act
extends only to a "natural person" engaged in farming, and that a partnership
could hardly be construed to be a "natural person."
2" See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 115.07 (14th ed. 1940). The Act has no ex-
press provision to this effect. Section 8 of the Act, however, provides that the
death or insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate proceedings that have already
begun.
2" Compare In re Fackelman, 248 Fed. 565 (S. D. Cal. 1918) with In re Wells,
298 Fed. 109 (S. D. Ohio 1924).271 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 11 5.07 (14th ed. 1940).
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though his insanity affects his adjudication as an individual.2 The
same is true where one of the partners is an infant.29 Generally speak-
ing, therefore, a partnership may be adjudged bankrupt regardless of the
status of a particular partner. This practice is in line with the "entity
theory" of a partnership.
As to who may file a petition in bankruptcy, there is no authoriza-
tion to be found in the Bankruptcy Act for the involuntary adjudica-
tion as bankrupt of a partnership save upon the petition of qualified
creditors.13 0  However, as to a voluntary adjudication, it is settled by
statute that all or less than all the partners, without the joinder or con-
sent of the remaining partners, may file, and the petition is deemed
voluntary insofar as it is filed on behalf of the partnership. 31  No act
of bankruptcy is required upon the filing of a voluntary petition, but
there exists the requirement "that where a petition is filed in behalf
of a partnership by less than all of the general partners, the petition
shall allege that the partnership is insolvent."3 2  The term "insolvent"
has caused some difficulty in the partnership field. While its definition
is set out in the Bankruptcy Act,33 its application to a partnership has
been left to judicial determination. It is now the weight of authority
that "in determining the question of insolvency, the individual property
of the partners should be considered. Where the assets of a partnership,
together with the individual properties of each partner exceed the
liabilities, the partnership is not insolvent." 34  Hence, under a voluntary
petition by less than all the partners,35 or under an involuntary petition
2'In. re Stein & Co., 127 Fed. 547 (7th Cir. 1904).
2' I' re Duiguid, 100 Fed. 274 (E. D. N. C. 1900) ("... it would be idle, how-
ever, for creditors to prove their debts against the infant during his minority for
he could disaffirm them upon reaching his majority.") The case presents a
quaere as to whether a debt for necessities would support a petition of bank-
ruptcy against the infant.
oKaufman-Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 F. 2d 594 (9th Cir. 1950). It is
doubtful if a partner qua creditor can file or join in filing an involuntary pe-
tition against his partnership. Cf. Meek v. Centre Banking Co., 268 U. S. 426
(1925), noted in 25 COL. L. REv. 963 (1925).
"11 U. S. C. §23(b) (1947), Kaufman-Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 F. 2d
594 (9th Cir. 1950).
The Act provides for service of the petition and writ of subpoena upon the
non-joining partners. 11 U. S. C. § 41(a) (1947).
-11 U. S. C. § 23(b) (1947).
a"A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provision of this title when-
ever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have
conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or re-
moved, with intent to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair
valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts." 11 U. S. C. § 1(19) (1947).
" Note, 14 ST. L. L. REv. 179, 183 (1929). Strangely enough, exempt assets
will be included in determining partnership insolvency. See McLaughlin, Aspects
of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. OF CH. L. Rxv. 369,
373 (1937).
"M.son v. Mitchell, 135 F. 2d 599 (9th Cir. 1943), noted in 29 CORN. L.
R-v. 244 (1943). This is the leading recent case on this proposition.
1953]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
alleging an act of bankruptcy where insolvency is a requirement, 0 it
must be shown that none of the partners are solvent in the sense of
being able to pay both his own and the firm debts. Clearly this view
applies the "aggregate theory" and indicates that the Act does not
purport to follow any one theory in a strict sense.
Since a partnership can be adjudged bankrupt as a separate entity,
it naturally follows that the partners as individuals can be adjudged
under either an involuntary or a voluntary petition. The Act has taken
the procedure one step further, and thereby settled a conflict of author-
ity, 7 by expressly providing that a partnership may be adjudged bank-
rupt either separately or jointly with one or more or all of its general
partners.38 A more workable practice is thus allowed by giving the
option of a separate or a joint peition. If a separate petition is filed
against the partnership, this may be made into a joint petition against
the partnership and the individuals by amendment, 9
There is one instance, however, under the Act when a firm will be
adjudged bankrupt without a specific petition against the partnership.
If all the general partners are adjudged bankrupt as individuals, this
will automatically cause an adjudication of the firm.40 It is logical and
proper that this result should follow. By the adjudication of the in-
dividuals, the total of the interests of the partnership has been drawn
into the administration of the bankruptcy court, hence the practical
consequences take on a formal recognition under the Act. Note that
under this rule "it is possible, in effect, for a partnership to be an in-
voluntary bankrupt even though it has not committed an act of bank-
ruptcy. This result follows where each of the partners has committed
an individual act of bankruptcy, as distinguished from a firm act of
bankruptcy, and has in consequence been the subject of an involuntary
petition and adjudication. In such a situation the firm also would be
adjudged a bankrupt. '41 Again it is evident that the Act does not
strictly adhere to the "entity theory" for this rule is a wholesome appli-
cation of the "aggregate theory."
Administration of Estates in the Bankruptcy Court. Adjudication
"o Acts of ,bankruptcy Nos. 2, 3 and 5 require that the partnership be insolvent
at the time the act is committed. 11 U. S. C. § 21(a) (1947). Note that act
No. 5 uses "insolvency" in both the bankruptcy and the equity sense.
' See Comment, 87 U. PA. L. Riy. 105 (1938).
" 11 U. S. C. § 23(a) (1947) (involuntary petition); 11 U. S. C. § 23(b)
(1947) (voluntary petition).
Where a joint involuntary petition is filed, it would seem that the require-
ments as to the number of creditors and the amount of debts would be satisfied
where the allegations are adequate as to the firm itself. See Mills v. J. H. Fisher
Co., 159 Fed. 897 (6th Cir. 1908).
" It re Russell, 7 F. 2d 508 (D. Del. 1925). For details as to the form
of the petition, see 1 COLLIeR, BANKRUPTCY 1 5.12 (14th ed. 1940).
"11 U. S. C § 23(i) (1947).
1I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 15.13 (14th ed. 1940).
[Vol. 31
NOTES AND COMMENTS
as a bankrupt is not always a prerequisite to the administration of an
estate in the bankruptcy court. In other words, it is settled that the
trustee of a bankrupt partnership may administer the estate of a non-
adjudicated partner.42 It has been suggested that the administration of
the non-adjudicated partner's estate is compulsory upon the firm trus-
tee.43  To 'date this point has not been decided, but it would seem that
in the usual instance it would be highly desirable to so administer the
estate. Only in this manner can the firm trustee effectively determine
what assets are available for the firm debts and what assets must be
returned to the partner for distribution to his separate creditors.
Where, however, an individual partner or less than all the partners
are adjudicated bankrupt, the trustee of the individual estates may not
administer the estate of other partners,4 4 nor may he administer the
partnership property in bankruptcy. 45 There is this exception: Where
there is consent on the part of the non-bankrupt partner or partners,
the partnership property may be administered in the bankruptcy court
even without its adjudication.46 That is, where one or more, but not
all of the partners are adjudged bankrupt and the other partner or
partners are solvent, the firm remains out of bankruptcy and its prop-
erty does not come in except by express or implied consent of the
solvent member or members.47  Whether there has been consent will
depend upon the facts of each case, but where the solvent partner allows
the trustee to take possession of the partnership property without assert-
ing his claim, he will be held to have consented to the administration
in the bankruptcy court. 48  Even though there is no consent, and con-
sequently no administration of the firm assets in the bankruptcy court,
the non-bankrupt partners are directed to "settle the partnership busi-
ness as expeditiously as its nature will permit and account for the in-
terest of the general partner or partners adjudged bankrupt." 49  This
naturally follows since the bankruptcy of a partner dissolves the part-
nership and gives the non-bankrupt partners the right to wind up the
2 Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (1913).
"2 Note, 29 CoL L. REv. 1134 (1929).
"Marnet Oil & Gas Co. v. Staley, 218 Fed. 45 (5th Cir. 1914).
42 11 U. S. C. § 23(i) (1947). This provision does not conflict with other
statutory allowances that a partnership may be adjudged bankrupt either separately
or jointly with one or more or all of its general partners. This provision deals
with the problem where a partner but not the firm is in bankruptcy. In this
situation the problem facing the court is getting jurisdiction, not of the firm, but
of the partner's interest in the firm.
Nor does subsection (i) conflict with subsection (d) for the latter is merely
permissive in nature.
"Id.
' Sturn v. Ulrich, 10 F. 2d 9 (8th Cir. 1925); In re Filman, 177 Fed. 170
(7th Cir. 1910).
"Kaufman-Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 F. 2d 594 (9th Cir. 1950).
"11 U. S. C. § 23(i) (1947).
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partnership affairs in a state court without the interference of the bank-
ruptcy court.50
There is no problem concerning the administration of estates where
all partners are adjudged bankrupt for it has been previously indicated
that in that instance the firm is also adjudged bankrupt.
Trustees. The provision in the Act pertaining to the appointment
of trustees underwent a substantial overhauling under the Chandler
Act in 1938. The amended section provides:
The creditors of the bankrupt partnership shall appoint the trus-
tee, who shall be the trustee of the individual estate of a general
partner being administered in the proceeding: Provided, how-
ever, that the creditors of a general partner adjudged a bank-
rupt may, upon cause shown, be permitted to appoint their sepa-
rate trustee for his estate .... 51
It is to be noted that before the firm creditors can exercise the pre-
rogative which is granted them, the partnership must have been ad-
judged bankrupt. Also, even where special circumstances are shown
for the appointment of a separate trustee for an individual bankrupt, a
prior adjudication of the individual partner is a condition precedent to
the authorization of a separate trustee. On the other hand, the non-
adjudication of the individual partner is ineffective to prevent an ad-
ministration of his estate by a trustee appointed by the firm.52 Unless
an unusual circumstance is shown, it would ordinarily be in the interest
of an orderly and unified administration that only one trustee be ap-
pointed. It has been held, however, that if the interests of the part-
nership and partner estates are in substantial conflict, 3 or if the assets
of the separate estate have so far been depleted that firm creditors have
no possible concern therein,"4 a separate trustee may be allowed.
It is apparent that whenever both the partnership assets and in-
dividual assets are being administered together, the trustee or trustees
should keep separate accounts of the different properties. The Act so
provides.5 5 The real purpose of such a rule is to enable the determina-
tion of what amount of the assets of each type of property will be avail-
able for firm or individual debts.
Marshalling and Distribution of Assets. The Act provides that the
bankruptcy court "may marshal the assets of the partnership estate
50N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-67 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
11 U. S. C. § 23 (c) (1947).
See note 42 supra.
" In re Currie, 197 Fed. 1012 (E. D. Mich. 1910) (allowed under the equitable
powers of the court prior to the amended subsection).
54In re Wood, 248 Fed. 246 (6th Cir. 1918) (allowed under the equitable
powers of .the court prior to the amended subsection.).
"11 U. S. C. § 23(e) (1947).
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and individual estates so as to prevent preferences and secure the
equitable distribution of the property of the several estates."' 6  This
provision is procedural and is applicable only to estates that are being
administered.57 The substantive rules of -distribution under the Bank-
ruptcy Act5" are in line with the rules in the Uniform Partnership Act,59
which follow the theory that partnership creditors shall have priority on
partnership property and separate creditors on individual property.
Prior to adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that firm creditors could share equally with in-
dividual creditors in the partners' estates,60 the theory being that since
the statute at the time made the general partners jointly and severally
liable for he debts of the partnership, 61 the effect was "to convert the
creditors of the firm into individual creditors of each member of the
partnership." 62  The clear and uneqivocal language of the present
statutes would surely warrant an opposite result today. At least there
is no indication that a bankruptcy court in North Carolina would follow
any rule other than that provided in the Bankruptcy Act.
In each instance of the marshalling of assets there naturally arises
the problem of differentiating firm assets from individual assets, and
firm debts from individual debts. No concrete rule can be set forth
for every situation but it is true that "all property originally brought
into the partnership stock or subsequently acquired by purchase or
otherwise, on account of the partnership, is partnership property" ;6
and "unless the contrary intent appears, property acquired with part-
nership funds is partnership property."64  As to the differentiation of
the debts, much will depend upon the use of the benefits erived from
a debt and the determination of whether credit was given to the firm or
the individual. The problem of distinguishing the debts is naturally
made more complex by the retirement of a partner, the sale of an in-
interest by a partner, and the death of a partner.6 5
" 11 U. S. C. § 23(h) (1947). The term "preference" undoubtedly has the
same meaning as that term in § 60(a) of the Act.
In re McConnell v. Williams, 32 A. B. R. 589 (1914).
1l U. S. C. § 23(g) (1947).
N. C. GEaN. STAT. § 59-70 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Walston, 187 N. C. 817, 123 S. E. 89
(1924) ; Rankin v. Jones, 55 N. C. 169 (1855) ; Hassell v. Griffin, 55 N. C. 119
(1855).
" Under the present statutes the partners are liable jointly and severally for
the torts and breaches of trust of a partner, and liable jointly for all other debts
and obligations of the partnership. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (1943 Recomp.
1950).
" Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Walston, 187 N. C. 817, 821, 123 S. E.
89, 92 (1924).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-38 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
"Id. For a discussion of the problem of differentiating the assets, see 1
CoLLiFR, BANKRUPTCY 5.29 (14th ed. 1940). For a related problem and its
remedies, see Note, 49 YALE L. J. 686 (1940).
" For pertinent statutory provisions see N. C. GEN. STAT. § 59-71 et $eq.
(1943 Recomp. 1950).
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It is recognized that in some cases there may be a joint and several
liability on the part of the partners so that a creditor may file proof
against both the partnership assets and individual assets. Thus, where
notes are made by the bankrupt firm and indorsed by an individual
partner, also a bankrupt, they are debts provable against both firm and
individual estates."6 The same is true where the individual partner is
joint maker with, or surety for, the partnership;07 or where all the part-
ners signed in their individual names an obligation executed in con-
nection with a partnership transaction. 68 Where there eixsts this joint
liability, the creditor may share in the individual estates of the several
partners on an equality with exclusively individual creditors,"9 and the
creditors, after the receipt of a dividend from the partnership estate,
might prove for the balance of his claim against the bankrupt estate of
the individual partners that were individually liable.70
The reduction of a partnership debt to judgment against the part-
nership and the individual members does not change the inherent char-
acter of the debt, nor make it "joint and several" so as to enable the
creditor to share on an equality with the individual creditors in the
individual estates.
7 1
Effect of Discharge of the Partnership on Unadjudicated Partners.
"[T]he discharge of a partnership shall not discharge the individual gen-
eral partners thereof from the partnership debts. ' 72 This rule is justly
the subject of severe criticism. 73 "A discharge of the firm 'entity,'
leaving the partners fully liable at law is a plain absurdity; and under
the doctrine of administration of all separate estates, there is no reason
why the unadjudicated partners should not be granted a discharge. 7 4
Since the partners' estates are considered in measuring firm solvency,
and the partners themselves submitted to most of the burdens of bank-
ruptcy through the administration of their estates in the firm proceed-
ings, it does seem incongruous to deny the discharge of a non-adjudi-
cated partner from the firm debts after all creditors' rights have been
satisfied. The existing rule "will have the practical effect of forcing
the individual member to seek protection in the less desired form of
adjudication under voluntary proceedings."7 5
"Roiso . Seaboard Nat. Bank, 247 Fed. 667 (3rd Cir. 1918).
'~Bank of Reidsville v. Burton, 259 Fed . 218 (4th Cir. 1919).
Robinson v. Seaboard Nat. Bank, 247 Fed. 667 (3rd Cir. 1918).
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Keeble, 20 F. 2d 84 (4th Cir. 1927).
of In re McCoy, 150 Fed. 106 (7th Cir. 1906). This method is disapproved
of in 6 -REmiNGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 2917 (4th ed. 1937).
"' Cutler Hardware Co. v. Hacker, 238 Fed. 146 (8th Cir. 1916).
7211 U. S. C. § 23(j) (1947).
71 See Comments, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 105, 112 (1938); 49 YALE L. J. 908,
924 (1940).
Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 908, 924-5 (1940).
' Comment, 87 U. PA. L. Rxv. 104, 114 (1938).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Where a partner is adjudged bankrupt there is specific statutory
authority enabling him to get a 'discharge from both his individual and
partnership debts.78 Adjudication is therefore a condition precedent
to discharge. An important objective of the Act is achieved under this
rule, viz., to enable the debtor to start anew unhampered by old obliga-
tions.
ROGER B. HENDRIX
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Federal Excise and Occupational Tax
on Wagering
The occupational tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 19511 which
levy a tax on persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers and
require such persons to register with the collector of internal revenue
were recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court as a valid
7- 11 U. S. C. § 23(j) (1947).
1 IxT. REv. CODE § 3285:
"(a) Wagers. There shall be imposed on wagers, as defined in subsection
(b), an excise tax equal to 10 per centum of the amount thereof.
"(d)" Persons liable for tax. Each person who is engaged in the business of
accepting, wagers shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter
on all wagers placed with him. Each person who conducts any wagering pool or
lottery shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter on all wagers
placed in such pool or lottery.
"(e) Exclusions for tax. No tax shall be imposed by this subchapter (1) on
any wager placed with, or on any wager -placed in a wagering pool conducted by,
a parimutuel wagering enterprise licensed under State law, and (2) on any
wager placed in a coin-operated device with respect to which an occupational tax
is timposed by section 3267."
INT. REv. CODE § 3290:
"A special tax of $50 per year shall be paid by each person who is liable for
tax under subchapter A or who is engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf
of any person so liable."
INT. REV. CODE § 3291:
"(a) Each person required to pay a special tax under this subchapter shall
register with the collector of the district-
(1) his name and place of residence;
(2) if be is liable for tax under subchapter A, each place of business where
the activity which makes him so liable is carried on, and the name and place of
residence of each person who is engaged in receiving wagers for him or on his
behalf; and
(3) if he is engaged in receiving wagers for or on 'behalf of any person liable
under subchapter A, the name and place of residence of each such person."
INT. REv. CODE § 3294:
"(a) Failure to pay tax. Any person who does any act which makes him
liable for special tax under this subchapter, without having paid such tax, shall,
besides being liable to the payment of the tax, be fined not less than $1,000 and
not more than $5,000.
"(c) Willful violations. The penalties prescribed by section 2707 with respect
to the tax imposed by section 2700 shall apply with respect to the tax imposed
by this subchapter."
INT. REv. CODE § 2707 provides that willful violations such as failure to give
the information required by law, shall subject such person to a fine of $10,000 or
imprisonment of from one to five years or both.
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